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Five years ago the Institute published Free Trade between Korea 
and the United States? by Inbom Choi and Jeffrey J. Schott, which 
analyzed the potential benefits and costs of pursuing a bilateral 
free trade agreement (FTA). At the time, neither government 
had  vetted  the  idea  in  bilateral  consultations,  though  some 
business groups in each country—and some members of the 
US  Congress—had  voiced  support  for  deepening  US-Korea 
economic ties through an FTA.
The 2001 study became the grist for numerous academic 
conferences and proved instructive for trade officials engaged 
in exploratory trade talks starting in late 2004. After exten-
sive bilateral consultations, US Trade Representative (USTR) 
Robert Portman and Korean Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong 
announced on February 2, 2006, their intention to start FTA 
negotiations with a targeted completion date before US trade 
promotion authority expires in June 2007.
A Korea-US FTA would be an important component of 
each  country’s  multitrack  trade  strategy.  Both  countries  give 
priority to the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) but have complemented 
those efforts with a growing number of bilateral and regional 
trade pacts. The US experience with FTAs goes back two decades; 
the Korean initiatives are more recent but increasingly active.
The US FTA policy is broad ranging and involves initiatives 
in the Western Hemisphere, East Asia and Oceania, Middle East 
and North Africa, and southern Africa (Schott 2004). The roster 
of current and prospective US FTA partners is reported in table 
1. These 31 countries account for almost 44 percent of total US 
merchandise trade and more than half of US exports. The list is 
headed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
members, Canada and Mexico, which together account for 30 
percent of total US trade. Korea ranks third in terms of the 
value of bilateral trade, with almost $70 billion in two-way trade 
flows in 2005—or more than twice the value of US trade with 
partners in other FTAs like the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement–Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) or the Andean-
3 (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru).
Korea was one of the last major trading nations to pursue 
FTAs. Like Japan, it engaged exclusively in GATT and WTO 
trade negotiations until the breakdown of the WTO ministe-
rial meeting in Seattle in December 1999. The resulting cloud 
over multilateral trade talks precipitated a sea change in Japanese 
policies toward FTAs, which in turn led Korean policymakers 
to adopt a more diversified negotiating strategy. Korea has, of 
course, been tempted in the past to engage in bilateral talks, at 
least with the United States. Since the conclusion of negotiations 
of the Canada-US FTA in late 1987, and the subsequent expan-
sion of the free trade regime to Mexico in 1993, Korea has at 
times considered the possibility of seeking accession to NAFTA 
or  negotiating  a  NAFTA-like  bilateral  FTA  with  the  United 
States. For a variety of reasons, however, such proposals were not 
considered politically viable on either side of the Pacific. When 
asked why at an Institute conference in May 2004, then USTR 
Robert Zoellick answered, “They’re not ready to talk about agri-
culture.”
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Today,  Korea  has  concluded  FTAs  with  Singapore, 
Chile, the European Free Trade Association, and nine of the 
ten members of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). These pacts have involved small amounts of trade 
but have not been without controversy—especially the Chil-
ean deal, which sparked a hot debate in the Korean National 
Assembly over grapes and the broader issue of agricultural 
reform. Those talks were pursued at least in part to prepare for 
more ambitious ventures with its major trading partners, the 
United States and Japan (and prospectively China as part of a 
Northeast Asian FTA). The Korean roster of FTA partners is 
set out in table 2. Together, current and prospective partners 
represent 41 percent of Korea’s total trade—almost 65 percent 
of that total is trade with the United States and Japan.
This  policy  brief  examines  the  economic  and  political 
interests that have prompted both countries to undertake free 
trade talks, the potential gains from liberalization, and key 
issues that need to be addressed in the negotiations. The results 
are consistent with the positive assessment of a Korea-US FTA 
in our earlier work (Choi and Schott 2001) but highlight the 
new challenges that have risen in the past five years due to 
heightened security concerns and the growing role of China 
in Asia-Pacific trade.
US and Korean objectiveS in an Fta
Why did Korea decide to pursue FTA negotiations with the 
United  States?  In  the  past,  Korean  interest  derived  mainly 
from concerns about trade diversion generated by regional 
agreements among North American countries and from the 
desire for special treatment under trade remedy statutes and 
dispute settlement systems comparable to that accorded to the 
NAFTA signatories. Such “me, too” regionalism is still evident 
in  Korean  declarations.  However,  current  Korean  interests 
transcend these “defensive” goals and cover a broad range of 
economic and political objectives.
On the economic front, the Korea-US FTA is seen as criti-
cal to Korea’s future for two related reasons: First, the Korean 
economy will have to undergo a substantial transformation to 
address the competitive challenges of China and India and to 
counter the adverse demographic trends facing Korean society 
over the next generation. Korean officials extol the catalytic 
effect that adherence to the disciplines of a “gold standard” 
FTA with the United States could have on the competitiveness 
of the Korean economy. They hope that FTA disciplines will 
yield a more open and competitive domestic market, promote 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) that prompt inno-
vation in Korean industry, and spur “knock-on improvements 
for corporate governance, the accounting system and govern-
ment bureaucracy.”1 In addition, the Korean government has 
earmarked 119 trillion won (currently about $125 billion) for 
investment in agriculture and income support for farmers over 
a 10-year period, which it hopes will spur productivity growth 
and help manage adjustment pressures in the farm sector.
Second, Korean officials recognize that they face a large 
challenge in achieving their goal of becoming the economic 
and financial “hub” of Northeast Asia. To do so, they must 
have not only a more competitive economy but also open, 
duty-free access to the world’s largest market and largest trader 
with East Asian countries. An FTA with the United States 
would help in both respects by “locking in” domestic reform 
and by securing better access to the US market than their East 
Asian competitors.
On the political front, Korean officials hope that there 
will be positive spillover effects from an FTA on the broader 
bilateral relationship. In part, they expect that the FTA will 
produce a better climate for pursuing North-South trade and 
investment on the Korean peninsula. To that end, they regard 
the Kaesong industrial complex as a practical manifestation 
of that development and want its output covered by the FTA 
regime (as it is in other FTAs that Korea has negotiated).
For the United States, an FTA with Korea would be the 
largest bilateral trade deal since NAFTA, yielding substantial 
export gains while also advancing important US foreign policy 
objectives in East Asia. Of course, this was true when FTA 
talks were initially vetted years ago. What has changed?
First, Korea has agreed to include agriculture in the pact. 
In addition, Korea took steps in January 2006 to reinstate 
imports of certain types of US beef (see below) and to miti-
gate long-standing problems with regard to screen quotas by 
cutting in half the number of days on which movie theaters 
must show domestic films.2 From the US perspective, these 
actions  removed  important  impediments  to  launching  the 
FTA talks. Recall that one of the US selection criteria for new 
FTA partners is that the partner country demonstrate (1) its 
commitment to pursue further liberalization of long-standing 
restrictions to trade and investment in the domestic economy 
and (2) its willingness to work together with US officials to 
achieve a successful conclusion to the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations (see Schott 2004, chapter 13). Liberalization of 
restrictions on farm trade and screen quotas should make it 
easier for Korea to contribute constructively to the develop-
1. See “Seoul Hopes Bilateral Trade Deal with US Will Be Catalyst for 
Change,” Financial Times, April 11, 2006, 4.
2. Korea still maintains other barriers against foreign programming transmit-
ted via networks, cable, and satellite, which need to be addressed in the FTA 
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ment of comprehensive agreements in these areas in the ongo-
ing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Second,  tensions  with  North  Korea  have  flared  anew, 
and US–South Korean relations have been strained over US 
military redeployment and differences over how to respond 
to North Korean provocations. An FTA would deepen the 
already strong commercial ties between the two countries and 
reinforce their political commitment to work cooperatively to 
deal with the security challenges on the Korean peninsula—as 
they have been doing in Iraq.
Third, US exports to Korea, despite growing sharply in 
the past few years, recovered only in 2005 to the 2000 level. 
The US share of Korean imports dropped from 18.2 percent 
in 2000 to 11.7 percent in 2005 (see table 3). While part of 
the loss in US market share is due to competition from other 
countries (the value of Korean imports increased sharply from 
China,  Japan,  and  the  European  Union  over  this  period), 
specific US products and services face significant barriers to 
entry to the Korean market. Indeed, USTR Portman noted in 
February 2006 that the United States was interested in FTA 
talks: “Because there is enormous opportunity for American 
exports, and…front and center is agriculture.”3 US officials 
also see prospective export gains in manufactured goods as 
well as insurance, entertainment, and other services. Indeed, 
the largest US export gains may come in services, especially 
in  financial  and  knowledge-based  sectors  where  US  firms 
are particularly competitive but face barriers in the Korean 
market, which have limited US export growth. While their 
share  has  declined  somewhat  since  2000,  US  firms  still 
account for almost 40 percent of Korean imports of commer-
cial services—more than twice the share of Japan and China 
combined (OECD 2005).4
Fourth, the Korean trade initiative has attracted support 
in Congress from members of both parties and is regarded as 
a vehicle to rebuild the protrade coalition that had fractured 
over the past decade (see Destler 2005). To be sure, maintain-
3. See USTR Robert Portman’s address to the Agricultural Outlook Forum, 
Arlington, VA, February 16, 2006.
4. In these service sectors, the main competitors are European firms, which 
have increased their share of Korean imports of business services in recent 
years and which may prod the European Commission to engage in FTA talks 
with Korea to keep pace with US initiatives.
ing bipartisan support will require the pact to address sensitive 
problems, including auto and beef trade as well as labor issues. 
The latter may prove particularly fractious if the pact applies 
to  the  Kaesong  industrial  complex,  since  labor  disciplines 
would require cooperation by North Korean authorities on 
international standards, which they have not been willing to 
follow. We discuss the challenges presented by the Kaesong 
initiative in more detail below.
In sum, an FTA with Korea seems to fit well with the crite-
ria that the George W. Bush administration has developed to 
select FTA partners (see Schott 2004, chapter 13). It furthers 
US export interests at a time of record current account deficits, 
promotes cooperation on multilateral trade negotiations and 
on regional security challenges, spurs Korea to accelerate the 
pace of its own economic reforms (which in turn will benefit 
US trade and investment), and presents an opportunity to 
restore bipartisan support for US trade initiatives.
overview oF bilateral trade 
and inveStment
The United States and Korea already have an extensive trade 
relationship: Bilateral merchandise trade was about $70 billion 
in 2005 (table 4), and bilateral services trade totaled $14 
billion in 2004 (table 7). Only US trade with the European 
Union, Canada and Mexico, China, and Japan are greater. In 
2005 the United States ran a bilateral merchandise trade defi-
cit with Korea of $17 billion.
Over the past five years, US-Korean two-way trade has 
grown by almost 25 percent, recovering from its sharp decline 
in 2001–02. Since then, however, growth in bilateral trade 
has lagged that of Korean trade with China and the Euro-
pean Union. As a consequence, China has replaced the United 
States as Korea’s leading trading partner and now accounts for 
18 percent of total Korean trade; Japan, the United States, and 
the European Union each had a 13 percent share in 2005.
The bulk of US-Korea trade is in manufactures. Agri-
culture accounts for only 3.5 percent of total two-way trade, 
down from 5 percent in 2003 due to the sharp drop in US beef 
exports (see below).
Nearly half of the bilateral trade is now in electronics 
(HS 85) and autos (HS 87). Total bilateral trade in electron-
ics currently exceeds that of any other sector, reaching nearly 
$20 billion in 2005. The US trade deficit in electronics, which 
topped $7 billion, constituted more than 40 percent of the 
overall deficit with Korea (see table 5). The United States and 
Korea engage in extensive intraindustry trade in memory chips 
and microprocessors. Electronics imports from Korea consist 
primarily of two items: cellular phones (43 percent of all elec-
tronics imports) and semiconductors (19 percent). Roughly 
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two-thirds of American electronics exports to Korea consist 
of semiconductors. Trade in autos broadly defined (HS 87) 
accounts for about 16 percent of bilateral trade; Korean car 
exports to the United States have topped $10 billion annually 
for the past two years, an increase of almost 52 percent since 
2001 (see table 6).
Trade in Services 
Two-way  trade  in  services  approached  $14  billion  in  2004 
(table 7). The United States ran a $4 billion bilateral trade 
surplus in services, with exports to Korea exceeding $9 billion 
and imports from Korea nearing $5 billion. Almost half of 
the increase in US service revenues since 2002 was generated 
by royalties and licensing fees, underscoring US strength in 
new economy sectors noted above. 
Korea has taken significant steps to liberalize its service 
sectors, but American firms continue to express dissatisfaction 
with the transparency of Korea’s regulatory regime in general 
and Korea’s treatment of foreign providers of financial services 
in  particular.  Nonetheless,  although  the  government  still 
retains significant ownership stakes in major Korean banks, 
privatizations and relaxed foreign ownership restrictions have 
led  to  sizeable  inflows  of  foreign  capital  to  help  revitalize 
the sector. In 2004 Citigroup purchased a minority share of 
KorAm Bank for $2.7 billion from the Carlyle Group and JP 
Morgan;5 the Korean government also sold its stake in Hana 
Bank (21 percent ownership sold in 2004; USTR 2005, 383). 
Soon  after  FTA  negotiations  were  announced  in  February 
2006, the Ministry of Finance and Economy proposed legisla-
tion that would propel a broad series of financial reforms and 
enable financial institutions to offer a wider range of services, 
including  brokerage,  asset  management,  and  investment 
banking.6 
Korea has the second largest insurance market in Asia—
$58.7 billion paid in premiums during the fiscal year ending 
March  31,  2005  (USTR  2006,  409).  While  the  1997–98 
financial crisis spurred some reform in the Korean insurance 
sector, American firms still face disadvantages in the Korean 
market. US complaints often revolve around Korea Post, the 
country’s fourth largest insurer. This government-run corpo-
ration is not regulated by the Korean Financial Supervisory 
5. See “Citigroup Wins KorAm Bank,” Financial Times, February 23, 2004, 
27. The Bank of America and the Samsung Group each held almost 17 per-
cent of KorAm’s equity before 2000, when the Carlyle-JP Morgan consortium 
acquired an 18 percent stake for about $435 million.
6. See “Korea to Allow Investment Banks in 2008,” Korea.net News, February 
19, 2006.
Service but is guided instead by the Ministry of Information 
and Communications, which imposes different and less strin-
gent regulatory requirements on Korea Post than on private 
firms  operating  in  the  Korean  market.  Nonetheless,  recent 
developments in Korea have demonstrated a willingness to 
pursue  reforms  in  financial  services,  including  legislation 
passed in April 2003 that facilitated the provision of insurance 
services by foreign companies.
Foreign Direct Investment 
The  United  States  traditionally  is  the  largest  provider  of 
Korea’s inward FDI; in 2004 US firms invested $4.7 billion in 
Korea (table 8). Americans channeled more than 40 percent 
of their Korean manufacturing investments into the computer 
and electronics industries.7 US investments constituted a 37 
percent share of all inward FDI in Korea, compared with 18 
percent from Japan, 10 percent from the Netherlands, and 9 
percent from China (table 8). Not surprisingly, Chinese FDI 
in Korea has grown dramatically from a small base over the 
past decade (table 8; OECD 2004, 219).
American and Korean automakers recently began invest-
ing in each other’s markets. In 2001 General Motors bought a 
controlling share in Daewoo Motors, the third largest Korean 
manufacturer. Daewoo accounted for roughly 13 percent of 
domestic vehicle production in 2003 (Ward’s Communica-
tions 2004). Korean production in the US market began on 
May 20, 2005, with the opening of Hyundai’s $1.1 billion plant 
in  Alabama.  This  production  facility  is  designed  to  employ 
more than 2,000 people and produce more than 300,000 cars 
at full capacity.8 Production by Hyundai Motor Manufactur-
ing Alabama is expected to reach 275,000 vehicles in 2006.9 
In March 2006 Kia announced it would invest $1.2 billion 
in a new plant in Georgia. The company expects to open the 
plant in 2008, employ 2,500 workers, and produce 300,000 
cars per year by 2009.10
7.  Data are from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, www.bea.gov.
8. See “Hyundai Moves into US,” Financial Times, May 23, 2005; and Hyun-
dai Motor Co. press release, “Hyundai Celebrates Grand Opening of Its First 
US Plant,” May 20, 2005, available at http://worldwide.hyundai-motor.com.
9.  See “Hyundai-Kia Strives to Globalize Production System,” Korea Herald, 
March 29, 2006.
10. See “Two Asian Automakers Plan Ventures in 2 States Left by U.S. Car-
makers, New York Times, March 14, 2006, 1.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4   Ju Ne  2 0 0 6
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Bilateral Disputes in the WTO 
Since the WTO entered into force in January 1995, the United 
States and Korea have filed 13 cases involving bilateral trade 
problems.  Six  of  the  seven  US  cases  against  Korea  have 
involved problems with nontariff agricultural protectionism, 
and the United States has usually been successful in generating 
favorable outcomes (either by mutual agreement or by WTO 
panel ruling). The seventh US case against Korea involved 
procurement problems associated with the construction of 
the Incheon airport, and the WTO panel ruled that the matter 
fell  beyond  Korea’s  obligations  in  the  WTO  government 
procurement agreement. All six of the Korean cases against 
the United States at the WTO have involved safeguards, anti-
dumping, or countervailing duties, and the panels generally 
supported Korea’s position.
Recently, WTO litigation has concluded a decade long 
bilateral dispute over semiconductors, a sector with more than 
$5 billion in two-way trade during 2005. Table 9 outlines 
major developments in the WTO cases involving semicon-
ductor trade. Korea first challenged the United States in the 
WTO in 1997, alleging that antidumping duties on Korean 
semiconductors were illegal. In 1999 the dispute settlement 
panel sided with Korea. Unhappy with delays in revoking the 
antidumping order, Korea again petitioned the WTO in April 
2000; subsequent consultations led to a negotiated solution 
in October 2000. In October 2003 the US Department of 
Commerce found that the Korean government provided ille-
gal subsidies to Hynix Semiconductor by pressuring banks to 
grant overly favorable financing to the company and levied a 44 
percent countervailing duty on Korean semiconductors. Korea 
challenged this finding in the WTO and received a partially 
favorable ruling from the dispute settlement panel. On appeal, 
however, the panel decision was reversed in June 2005 and the 
countervailing duty order against Korea validated.
a General eqUilibriUm analySiS 
oF a Korea-US Fta
What gains can each country expect to achieve from a successful 
negotiation, and how would those gains be distributed within 
each economy? One widely used tool that economists deploy 
for such calculations is an applied general equilibrium (AGE) 
model. Unlike approaches that examine different sectors in 
isolation, AGE models use equations and detailed data to take 
account of key intra and international relationships among 
producers and consumers. This allows such models to provide 
better estimates of how trade reforms would affect produc-
tion,  consumption,  trade,  prices,  employment,  and  overall 
welfare in each region. While limited by data constraints and 
simplifying assumptions built into the model’s equations, such 
analyses do provide conservative estimates of overall welfare 
gains and interesting insights regarding prospective economic 
adjustments in each country. The actual experience of FTAs 
often  exceeds  the  modest  projections  from  AGE  models 
(DeRosa and Gilbert 2005).
Numerous  studies  of  a  potential  Korea-US  FTA  have 
been conducted in both countries over the past two decades. 
Overall, the analyses indicate that there are large gains for each 
country but that an FTA would require adjustments, includ-
ing in agriculture. These studies either omit or only sparsely 
cover services trade, suggesting that additional welfare gains 
would be generated by services trade and investment reforms.
The first joint Korea-US study of a potential FTA was 
Choi and Schott (2001). We found that the net welfare gains 
from an FTA would range from 0.02 to 0.13 percent of GDP 
for the United States and from 0.4 to 2.4 percent of GDP for 
Korea. For the United States, most of the gains derive from 
export  expansion  into  the  Korean  market  as  trade  barriers 
decline. For Korea, the largest gains come from using Korean 
resources more efficiently and replacing inefficient domestic 
production with imports. Importantly, potential gains of a 
Korea-US FTA would be more than halved for both econo-
mies if agricultural trade were excluded. The Korea Institute 
for International Economic Policy conducted a similar study 
but using a more recent version of the AGE model and a 2001 
database (Lee and Lee 2005). It reported that Korea’s welfare 
gains would range from 0.42 to 2.27 percent of GDP—very 
similar to Choi and Schott (2001), though the scenarios tested 
were somewhat different.
For this policy brief we have updated the earlier Insti-
tute calculations using a multisector, global AGE model to 
simulate the broad economic effects of a Korea-US FTA. The 
model for this study has 22 sectors,11 five factors of produc-
tion (unskilled labor, skilled labor, capital, land, and natural 
resources), and four regions (Korea, the United States, Japan, 
and the rest of the world). The economic structure is stan-
dard:12  perfect  competition,  constant  returns  to  scale,  and 
11. Tables 12, 13, and 14, discussed below, show the list of sectors.
12. The basic structure of the model is the same as the one used in Bradford 
and Lawrence (2004) and Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005).
Potential gains of a Korea-US FTA would 
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fully employed factors that can move freely across sectors13 but 
not across international boundaries. The model also assumes, 
as is standard, that within each region the amounts of the four 
factors besides capital are fixed. We make two assumptions 
concerning the capital stock in each region; each assumption 
leads to different simulation results. Assumption one is that 
the amount of capital is fixed, as with the other four factors. 
This  assumption  gives  what  one  might  call  medium-run 
results—the economic effects after factors have adjusted across 
sectors. Assumption two is that the capital stock is allowed to 
increase through investment after trade opening. This assump-
tion gives what one might call long-run results—the economic 
effects after both factor movement and capital stock growth.
The model uses the most recent version of the state-of-the-
art Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database: GTAP6. 
Constructing such datasets is a huge undertaking, so that the 
data have a lag of a few years. The GTAP6 data, released in 
2005, are from 2001.
We run two scenarios to paint a broad-brushed picture of 
the potential effects of a Korea-US FTA: complete free trade 
between Korea and the United States and complete free trade 
in everything except rice.14 The first scenario enables us to see 
the overall economic stakes involved in this endeavor. The 
second allows us to account for the fact that Korea is unlikely 
to fully open its rice market. The differences between the two 
will provide an estimate of how much is taken off the table by 
excluding rice. For each scenario, we compute a medium-run 
and long-run result, as described above. The adjustment path 
is not explicitly modeled. The simulations simply report the 
prediction for the new equilibrium after all adjustment has 
occurred. 
Table 10 shows the overall welfare results, in billions of 
US dollars and as a percentage of GDP. The table reports the 
change in equivalent variation15 for each region. These numbers 
do not take account of the adjustment costs that many would 
have to bear as they move from one sector to another. 
Overall, Korea stands to benefit substantially from an FTA 
with the United States. In the medium term, such an initiative 
would produce $20 billion in net gains (or almost 2.6 percent 
of GDP) if rice were excluded. The extra payoff to opening 
13. Land and natural resources are restricted to the agriculture and other 
primary products sectors.
14. For this scenario, we keep in place the barriers in paddy and processed rice.
15.  Equivalent variation (EV) is the amount of money one would need to give 
the region (without any change in policy) to make it just as well off as it would 
be after the trade opening. A negative value for EV means that the region is 
hurt by the opening and that one would need to take money away to put the 
region at the same welfare level as it would be after the trade opening.
rice would be $7 billion or an additional 1 percent of GDP. 
Looking at the longer term, the potential gains are even larger: 
$41 billion without rice (5.2 percent of GDP) and an extra 
$10 billion or 1.4 percent of GDP if it is included. Such large 
efficiency gains from opening the Korean rice market validate 
efforts to compensate rice farmers through income supports 
and other adjustment assistance as the Korean government has 
recently proposed. Presumably the gains from Korea opening 
to more competitive rice producers, such as Thailand, would 
be even larger.16 
The US effects are much smaller, for three main reasons: 
First, the US economy is 15 times bigger than the Korean 
economy, so trade with Korea has a much smaller impact on 
the US economy. Second, the United States has lower initial 
barriers, so that it does not reap as much in the way of internal 
efficiency gains. Third, the model does not have detailed data 
on trade in services or on barriers to trade and investment in 
services and thus probably grossly underestimates the welfare 
gains from services trade liberalization.
Interestingly,  the  model  reports  that—although  the 
dollar amounts are small—the United States would in fact 
gain more from the FTA if rice were excluded. This surprising 
result stems from the fact that the United States subsidizes 
rice, along with other agricultural goods. Under the model’s 
constraining  assumptions,  opening  the  large  and  lucrative 
Korean rice market only to US exporters would cause many 
US resources to shift to this sector, which because of the large 
subsidies (which are held constant in percentage terms) would 
actually hurt the US economy.
As a practical matter, however, we are unlikely to see what 
the scenario assumes: that Korea would completely and quickly 
open its rice market to the United States and that US subsidies 
to rice would stay fixed. We are more likely to see gradual 
opening of the Korean rice market, and, over that time, US 
subsidies to rice could well shrink due to US budgetary pres-
sures and WTO reform commitments.
This model can provide a rough indication of the distri-
butional effects of the FTA. Table 11 shows the changes in real 
factor prices under the various scenarios for the FTA partners. 
(The factor price impacts in the other regions are tiny.) Land 
and  natural  resources  are  heavily  protected  in  Korea,  and 
current owners of those assets would suffer large losses from 
an FTA with the United States. Overall, the model indicates 
significant gains for Korean capital and labor but, again, it 
16. We also used the model to estimate effects of the bilateral FTA on the rest 
of the world and found cumulative losses of $4 billion to $5 billion in the 
medium-term scenario and $7 billion to $9 billion in the long-run scenario. In 
other words, FTA preferences will generate trade diversion, especially affecting 
products protected by relatively high most-favored-nation tariffs. N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4   Ju Ne  2 0 0 6
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takes  no  account  of  the  adjustment  costs  that  workers  in 
contracting sectors would have to bear. In the United States, 
the  returns  to  land  and  natural  resources  would  increase 
significantly as a result of gaining preferential access to Korean 
markets, especially in agriculture. Even without rice, opening 
in other agricultural markets would account for most of the 
gains to land and natural resources in the United States.
Table 12 provides a more nuanced look at adjustment and 
distribution of gains and losses. Examining the hypothetical 
situation  in  which  rice  is  fully  liberalized,  we  see  that  the 
Korean rice industry would contract dramatically. By the same 
token, the US rice sector would explode, expanding more than 
seven times (from a very small base) in order to serve the Kore-
an market. The model predicts that Korean output of wheat, 
fruits and vegetables, meat, dairy, processed rice, and other 
food products would expand with the FTA. Wheat and fruits 
and vegetables expand in large part because land in the model 
is constrained to remain in agriculture (one of the first four 
sectors) so that the collapse of the rice market frees up land for 
these sectors. As a practical matter, major opening in agricul-
tural and primary products probably would cause land to shift 
over time into manufacturing and services, so that output in 
these agriculture sectors would not expand as much or would 
shrink. In addition, wheat gets a boost from having low initial 
tariffs: Across-the-board trade opening tends to favor sectors 
with below-average tariffs. See table 13 for the initial tariff  
rates in the model. 
The meat sectors also show large percentage gains, but, 
like wheat, these sectors are quite small, which exaggerates the 
percentage changes. Along with wheat and fruits and vegeta-
bles, meat and dairy have initial protection levels below those 
of the much larger rice and other primary products sectors, so 
that the FTA tends to shift resources toward meat and dairy. 
In manufacturing, the model shows lower-technology sectors 
in Korea—textiles, apparel, leather, metals, and other manu-
facturing (including toys)—expanding and higher-technology 
sectors contracting. This result, as well, is likely to be counter-
acted by other forces outside the model: In recent years, Korea 
has faced price pressures in lower-technology manufacturing 
from China and other countries, which would prevent the kind 
of expansions that the model predicts based on 2001 data.
The impacts on the United States are much smaller, as 
expected. The model predicts reductions in the US wheat and 
fruits and vegetables sectors because, within the model, these 
sectors lose resources to the surging paddy rice sector and to the 
other primary products sector, which, like paddy rice, expands 
because its initial barriers in Korea are quite high. The lower 
initial barriers, however, in wheat and fruits and vegetables 
(table 13) may indicate that the dataset has not captured the 
full extent of nontariff barriers in these sectors. It is quite likely 
that, if Korea fully opened those sectors, including eliminating 
nontariff barriers, US output in these sectors would increase 
with an FTA. A similar dynamic may apply to the two meat 
sectors: Actual Korean barriers, including nontariff barriers , 
may be higher than the dataset show, in which case an FTA 
would lead to expansion of US meat production, instead of the 
small losses predicted. If Korean rice is opened, processed rice 
in the United States shrinks because of the diversion of paddy 
rice to Korea. Processed rice, though, along with paddy rice, 
wheat, and vegetables and fruits, make up tiny shares of the 
US economy. Overall, the model predicts that an FTA would 
have very small impacts on US manufacturing and services.
The medium- and long-term scenarios tell very similar 
stories  concerning  the  differential  effect  of  the  FTA  across 
sectors. The major difference between the two is that over-
all output is higher in the longer term, so that when there 
are noticeable sectoral differences between the two scenarios, 
expansions are larger and contractions smaller.
Overall, an FTA would induce large shifts in the compo-
sition of Korean employment across sectors. Note, however, 
that  trade  opening  does  not  have  a  significant  impact  on 
total employment; rather, trade opening causes sectoral shifts 
in employment that make the economy more efficient and 
richer.
Table 14 presents estimates of the number of Korean jobs 
that would be gained or lost on net in the individual sectors in 
the medium-term scenario. If rice trade were fully liberalized, 
almost all Korean rice workers would lose their jobs. Major 
job losses would also occur in the other primary products 
sectors and in vegetables and fruits. In manufacturing, other 
machinery and equipment, electronic equipment, and other 
transport would see significant job losses, while lower-tech-
nology sectors would see substantial gains. Under the other 
scenario in which rice is excluded, the job losses in that sector 
would be reduced from over 200,000 to about 27,000. Even 
though rice itself would continue to be protected from global 
competition, expansions in other sectors would nevertheless 
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pull workers out of rice. Again, as a practical matter, we would 
expect some market opening for rice, perhaps via a tariff-rate 
quota, so the income and employment effects would be within 
the range of the two scenarios.
Key iSSUeS in the Fta neGotiationS
The two countries have set themselves an ambitious task to 
conclude negotiations before US trade promotion authority 
expires in June 2007. The task is doable, though difficult. 
Because of what was learned in the “prenegotiating” sessions in 
2005, trade officials will be in a better position to resolve many 
of the core trade and investment problems, including politi-
cally sensitive liberalization of peak US tariffs in manufactures 
and agriculture and Korean regulatory reform in financial and 
entertainment services. However, there remain several difficult 
and sensitive items that will command the priority attention 
of both US and Korean officials. Most involve Korean reforms, 
underscoring the broad modeling results reported earlier that 
Korean welfare gains derive primarily from allocative efficiency 
effects—related to reforms of Korea’s own restrictions—while 
US welfare gains come from increased export opportunities in 
the Korean market. Notwithstanding, both sides also benefit 
from reform of remaining US restrictions on trade in goods 
and services.
Key issues for the United States include autos, beef, and 
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement issues. Those for 
Korea include resolution of steel antidumping problems, access 
to the US visa waiver program, and coverage of production in 
the Kaesong industrial complex. Most can be addressed in the 
FTA itself; some will require bilateral initiatives pursued in 
parallel with the trade talks.
Automobile Trade
Formal efforts to resolve bilateral trade frictions over auto-
mobiles have spanned more than a decade. With the rapid 
growth in Korean auto exports to the US market in recent 
years, the disparity in access to the two markets has provoked 
more heated concerns that will inevitably echo at the FTA 
negotiating table.
In 1995, under pressure from a US Super 301 investiga-
tion, Korea signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
with  the  United  States  in  which  it  agreed  to  substantially 
reduce its annual vehicle and special excise taxes, streamline 
standards requirements, correct residual tensions from anti-
import campaigns, and eliminate advertising restrictions for 
foreign automakers.
In 1998 the United States again used threats from a Super 
301 investigation to convince Korea to undertake additional 
commitments  in  a  second  MoU.  Korea  agreed  to  further 
reduce the annual vehicle and the special excise taxes, elimi-
nate the education and rural development taxes, and lower 
the bound tariff on vehicles from 80 to 8 percent. Korea also 
promised  to  continue  streamlining  standards  requirements 
and to institute a self-certification system by 2002 in order to 
allow US manufacturers to certify their own products for sale 
in Korea, to create a secure finance system for the purchase 
of vehicles, and to step up efforts to counteract the effects of 
previous anti-import campaigns (see comparison of the MoUs 
in table 15).
In 2001 the two countries created the Automotive Stan-
dards Experts Working Group to facilitate implementation of 
the MoUs. Bringing together experts from both the govern-
ment and automotive sectors, the group has addressed concerns 
regarding self-certification procedures, environmental testing, 
tire pressure monitoring systems, and radio frequencies for 
remote keyless entry (USTR 2005, 2006). Before announcing 
FTA talks in early 2006, Korea agreed to postpone implement-
ing an emissions standard that would require all foreign cars 
to be customized for sale in Korea.17  Korea also extended the 
grace periods for foreign vehicles to comply with emissions 
and average fuel economy targets, through 2008 and 2009 
respectively (USTR 2006).
Despite the MoUs, US auto exporters have not increased 
shipments to the Korean market, selling only 4,251 vehicles 
there in 2005.18 To be sure, the fact that the MoU pledges to 
improve market access does not guarantee an increase in sales: 
Producers have to offer competitive products. A large segment 
of the Korean market is taken by small-engine vehicles, not the 
mainstay of major US producers, and Korean companies have 
taken advantage of their protected domestic market to become 
more competitive over time (particularly in the low end of 
the vehicle market)—witness the rapid growth in Korean auto 
exports since 1997. In 2005 Korea exported about 2.6 million 
autos or 70 percent of the 3.7 million units produced that year.
17. See “U.S., Korea Launch FTA Talks, Will Seek To Reach Agreement by 
End of This Year,” International Trade Reporter, February 9, 2006.
18.  In that year, total Korean auto imports were about 31,000; domestic sales 
by Korean producers were 1.1 million units. Data are from the Korean Auto-
mobile Manufacturers Association (www.kama.or.kr) and Korean Automobile 
Importers and Distributors Association (www.kaida.co.kr).
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That said, the low import penetration of larger vehicles is 
still notable. The explanation is at least partly due to Korean 
tax and regulatory policies, the residual effects of prior anti-
import campaigns, and technical standards.
Taxes
In addition to the 8 percent tariff on passenger auto imports—
more than triple the US rate—the Korean government assesses 
more than 10 taxes on top of the tariff, creating a cascading 
effect that exaggerates taxes on imports, especially cars with 
larger engines, since the duties accumulate from a higher base 
on imported autos (cif + tariff + other previously imposed 
taxes)  than  on  Korean  models.  Such  a  tax  structure  hits 
imports of larger engines (over 2000cc) both because of the 
higher tax base and because the tax rates themselves are higher 
(see table 16). Even if the tariffs disappear on bilateral trade 
under an FTA, foreign automakers fear that the structure of 
domestic taxes will continue to depress demand in the Korean 
market for large-engine cars relative to small cars.
Anti-Import Bias
Government-sanctioned  anti-import  campaigns  during  the 
1990s fostered the public perception in Korea that purchas-
ing imported automobiles is unpatriotic. The “buy Korean” 
mentality  was  shaped  not  only  by  protectionist  statements 
from high-level Korean government officials but also by media 
campaigns portraying imported automobiles as unnecessary 
luxury items. Demand for imported autos was also hampered 
by limits on advertising and by targeted tax audits of foreign 
car owners. While such practices have long since been termi-
nated,19 their effects have lingered on Korean consumer prefer-
ences (Noland 1996, 13).
Standards 
Technical standards can sometimes impose nontariff barriers 
to trade, particularly if used to substantially raise production 
costs for imported vehicles. For this reason, US officials pushed 
for corecognition of automotive standards in the 1998 MoU, 
and Korea agreed to take steps in that direction. However, 
the US auto industry has expressed dissatisfaction with the 
speed of Korea’s compliance and continues to nudge Korea to 
universally adopt either the US or EU standards on items 
19.  Indeed, as a symbolic show of penance, the Korean government sponsored 
events in the late 1990s showcasing imported cars and purchased a number of 
American autos for use by the national police (KEI 2003).
such as diesel emission, tail pipe emissions, steering systems, 
and tinted glass.20
Beef Trade
During 2003 US beef exports to Korea totaled nearly $800 
million, making it the third largest foreign market for Ameri-
can beef.21 At the end of that year, however, Korea banned 
imports of American beef after officials confirmed the first 
US case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad 
cow” disease. In January 2006 Korea partially lifted the ban, 
allowing imports of US beef from cattle less than 30 months 
of age and promising to remove remaining health and safety 
related restrictions by the end of March. However, in March 
2006, another US case of BSE caused a delay in the lifting of 
the ban.
The current BSE-related ban is the latest iteration of bilat-
eral beef trade problems over the past almost two decades. As 
highlighted in table 17, attempts to resolve beef issues have 
resulted  in  numerous  Section  301  investigations,  bilateral 
agreements, and WTO dispute settlement proceedings. These 
initiatives targeted issues such as low market access quotas, 
discriminatory shelf-life restrictions, and domestic producer 
subsidies in Korea.
Round #1: 1988–93. In 1988 the USTR began a Section 
301 investigation into Korea’s beef import quotas and subse-
quently took the case to GATT dispute resolution. During 
the  proceedings,  Korea  claimed  its  quantitative  restrictions 
on beef imports were justified under the balance of payments 
exception to the GATT, but the panel disagreed. To facilitate 
implementation of the dispute panel’s recommendations, the 
United  States  and  Korea  signed  two  bilateral  agreements, 
one in 1990 and another in 1993. In addition to outlining a 
schedule for gradual increases of Korean quotas on imports of 
beef, the two parties agreed on a simultaneous buy/sell system 
that would directly link foreign suppliers with Korean retailers 
and distributors of beef.
Round #2: 1994–95. Despite the two bilateral agreements, 
US beef exporters complained that their products were being 
excluded  from  the  Korean  market  due  to  excessively  short 
shelf-life restrictions combined with onerous standards test-
20. See “Michigan Governor, Senators Seek Auto Concessions In Korea FTA,” 
Inside US Trade, February 17, 2006.
21. See US Department of Agriculture press release 0004-06, “Johanns and 
USTR Portman Welcome Progress to Reopen Korean Market to U.S. Beef,” 
January 13, 2006, www.usda.gov.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4     J u Ne  2 0 0 6
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ing. The USTR initiated another Section 301 investigation 
under the new WTO procedures. Korea subsequently agreed 
to curb customs delays and revise shelf-life restrictions (USITC 
1996).
Round #3: 1997–2001. In 1997 and 1998, Korea did not 
fill its minimum access quota for beef, prompting the United 
States to again bring suit at the WTO in 1999. The WTO 
appellate body condemned Korea for failing to meet its beef 
quota, citing as causes the rules governing wholesale distri-
bution,  excessive  domestic  support,  discrimination  against 
grass-fed cattle, and other measures. In January 2001 Korea 
replaced its tariff rate quota on beef with a 40 percent tariff 
(WTO 2004).
Pharmaceuticals
Recent problems regarding Korean pricing and reimbursement 
policies for pharmaceuticals will also likely be given priority 
in the FTA negotiations since they allegedly pose significant 
access barriers for, or undercut the profitability of, US prod-
ucts in the $4 billion Korean pharmaceutical market—among 
the top 15 markets worldwide (CRS 2006). In addition, as in 
their other FTA initiatives, US officials will seek to augment 
WTO obligations with regard to pharmaceutical patents.
The  pricing  problems  can  be  summarized  as  follows: 
Korea has a nationalized healthcare system, which, like the 
US system, poses large fiscal challenges. The Korean govern-
ment has responded to the mounting deficits in its healthcare 
programs by enacting cost containment measures that report-
edly discriminate against imports by systematically undervalu-
ing pharmaceuticals and skewing demand toward domestically 
produced generic drugs. As a result, per capita spending on 
pharmaceuticals in Korea averages $115 annually, less than 
half the OECD average (AMCHAM Korea 2004). Pricing 
policy  complaints  advanced  by  US  pharmaceutical  firms 
revolve around three main issues:
•	 A-7  pricing.  Per  its  agreement  with  the  American 
government,  Korea  prices  “innovative”  pharmaceuti-
cals according to their average price in a representative 
pool of seven advanced markets. However, the Korean 
Health Insurance Review Agency (HIRA) has rejected 
nearly two-thirds of the applications for medicines to be 
recognized as “innovative” and priced at A-7 levels. As 
a result, reimbursement for some imported pharmaceu-
ticals is significantly reduced, and some drugs have not 
been offered in the Korean market (USTR 2006, 415).
•	 Actual transaction pricing (ATP). ATP was introduced 
in  2004  to  increase  transparency  in  pricing  drugs  and 
to curb the ability of hospitals to profit by demanding 
discounted prices from pharmaceutical companies while 
billing  the  government  for  full  price  reimbursement. 
American firms initially praised the implementation of 
ATP but have since been concerned about lapses in its 
enforcement.
•	 Triennial repricing. As announced in 2003, all drugs 
eligible for reimbursement under the nationalized insur-
ance scheme are subject to repricing every three years. 
American  pharmaceutical  firms  have  complained  that 
this program is used solely to justify price decreases.
The  two  countries  have  met  regularly  to  discuss  these 
pharmaceutical issues since the 2002 creation of the Pharma-
ceuticals Working Group, which includes representatives from 
the government and pharmaceutical companies in each coun-
try. In 2005 USTR Portman noted that the possibility for FTA 
negotiations hinged partially upon progress in pharmaceutical 
issues. Korea addressed this concern in October 2005, promis-
ing not to introduce any new drug pricing measures in the 
near future, to hear appeals for disputes over drug reimburse-
ment decisions, and to provide written justifications for pric-
ing decisions. The two countries agreed to establish a special 
working group on pharmaceuticals as part of the formal FTA 
negotiating structure.
However, on May 3, 2006, the Korean Ministry of Health 
and Welfare announced a new drug approval policy for HIRA. 
Possibly by September 2006, HIRA will institute a so-called 
positive list approach that will allow it to exclude new pharma-
ceuticals from the list of products approved for reimbursement 
under the national insurance program. Among other criteria, 
cost effectiveness will figure prominently in HIRA’s decisions 
to approve new drugs. This change in policy is intended to 
help HIRA reduce pharmaceutical costs from more than 29 
percent of national insurance payments to less than 24 percent 
by 2011. The new approval process will not affect the 22,000-
plus drugs that HIRA has already approved.22 
Trade Remedy Laws and Competition Policy
The United States has never included obligations on subsidies 
or unfair trade statutes in any of its free trade pacts.23 Only 
NAFTA  contains  provisions  specifically  focused  on  anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, and those are limited to 
dispute settlement (see Hufbauer and Schott 2005, chapter 4). 
22. See “USTR, Industry Push Korea on New Reimbursement Program,” 
Inside US Trade, May 26, 2006; and Korea Ministry of Health and Welfare 
press release, May 3, 2006 (in Korean).
23. This section draws heavily on a written contribution from Edward M. 
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Nonetheless, Korean officials are concerned about the inci-
dence of US antidumping and countervailing duties  against 
Korean imports and have contested several of these cases in 
the WTO (as noted earlier). As of February 2006, the United 
States  maintained  24  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty 
measures against Korea. All but six of these orders are against 
iron and steel products (see table 18).
Korea faces additional hurdles to exporting steel when the 
United States imposes safeguards, as it did in both February 
2000 (line pipe) and March 2002 (numerous steel products). 
In  each  case,  Korea  won  its  case  at  the WTO  and  forced 
the United States to revoke the safeguards. However, these 
successes  came  only  after  significant  drops  in  steel  export 
revenues. The volume of Korean steel exports to the United 
States in 2002 fell 16 percent from the 2001 level (and about 
40 percent from its peak in 1998).
While the economics textbook argues that antidumping 
is inappropriate for an integrated market, the US political 
bible  commands  that  “thou  shall  not  touch  antidumping 
laws” in FTAs. In any event, Korea doesn’t have a pervasive 
antidumping problem in the US market; it has a steel trade 
problem, which is lessening over time. FTA negotiators will 
find more fertile ground in addressing the specific issue rather 
than mounting a frontal attack against dumping statutes.
Originally, antidumping laws were introduced to coun-
ter  predatory  pricing  practices  and  strengthen  competitive 
markets.  Considerable  literature  suggests  that  antidumping 
measures are administered in a way so as effectively to reduce 
competition, and such reduction reduces the benefits associat-
ed with any FTA (Lindsay and Ikenson 2002, Finger and Zlate 
2003). While antidumping measures likely will be excluded 
from the negotiating agenda, there might be other opportuni-
ties for an effective competition policy to be included in a 
Korea-US FTA.
For  example,  restrictive  or  monopolistic  arrangements 
for distribution of imports are one type of behind-the-border 
anticompetitive practice that inhibits realization of gains from 
trade. These arrangements can serve to “soften” the impact of 
competition from imports to domestic competing firms while 
at the same time generating rents for importers, at the expense 
of consumers. The arrangements can be private, e.g., import 
or export cartels, or arrangements where the distribution of 
imports is under the exclusive control of private parties that 
have some interest in restricting the volume of imports. But, 
also, the arrangements can be public or at least facilitated by 
public policy (where less-than-fair-value trade laws, as already 
discussed, stand out as an example). At the very least, FTA 
negotiators should explore whether such arrangements exist or 
are likely to be created—perhaps in both countries via involve-
ment of competition agencies (the Federal Trade Commission 
and/or the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in 
the United States and the Korean Fair Trade Commission). 
Unfortunately, this involvement might prove difficult, because 
competition agencies generally avoid getting involved in inter-
national trade discussions, even if the overlap between compe-
tition and trade policy issues is substantial.
Another area in which investigation is needed is whether 
there are unduly high entry barriers that would inhibit either 
imports or, perhaps more importantly, FDI in sectors that 
might be subject to more competition under an FTA except 
for the existence of these entry barriers. Identification and 
reduction of unduly high entry barriers likely will bear the 
most fruit in the services sectors, where in many instances 
trade  in  the  relevant  services  requires  in  the  “importing” 
nation a commercial presence of the seller of services, via FDI. 
Thus, in practical terms, the creation of more competition, 
and realization of the benefits thereof, really comes down to 
a review of whether there are undue barriers to FDI, includ-
ing via mergers and acquisitions. It is clear that neither the 
United States nor Korea is closed to this investment, because 
a substantial amount of FDI has in fact entered both nations 
in recent years. Nonetheless, a review of whether there remain 
unduly restrictive barriers to FDI should remain a priority, 
because  reduction  or  removal  of  such  barriers,  where  they 
exist, has the potential to create substantial gain.
US Visa Waiver Program
The US visa waiver program was set up 20 years ago to facilitate 
tourism and redirect US consular resources to countries where 
tighter screening of applicants is needed. Eligible nationals 
from selected countries can travel to the United States for tour-
ism or business for up to 90 days without a visa. To participate 
in the program, a country must inter alia offer reciprocal privi-
leges to US citizens, issue machine-readable passports with 
biometric data, and have a rejection rate for B-1/B-2 (nonim-
migrant) visas of less than 3 percent. The program currently 
covers 27 countries, mostly European but also  members of the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, such as 
Japan, Australia, Singapore, Brunei, and New Zealand. Since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, border controls 
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have become more stringent, and since then there have been 
no additions to the list of eligible countries. In fact, Argentina 
(in 2002) and Uruguay (in 2003) subsequently were removed 
from the program; Korea has never been eligible due in part to 
its nonimmigrant visa rejection rate.
Currently, US visas are processed only at the consular 
office of the US embassy in Seoul. In 2004, about 360,000 
South  Koreans  applied  for  a  nonimmigrant  visa  (Hwang 
2005). Access to the visa waiver program is a priority for busi-
ness groups in both countries.
From a business perspective, exemption from visa require-
ments  is  part  of  the  trade  facilitation  agenda  and  should 
be  included  in  FTA  obligations.  Since  the  Chile-US  FTA, 
however, Congress has insisted that no immigration matter, 
including visas, be included in trade pacts. For that reason, the 
visa waiver issue will not be part of the FTA but likely will be 
discussed on a parallel track.
What  should  be  done?  Officials  should  focus  first  on 
how to make it easier for Koreans to get visas and then on 
meeting the qualifications for the waiver program. Increasing 
the number of US consular offices in Korea that handle visas, 
accelerating the introduction of biometric data in new Korean 
passports, and educating individual applicants and tour opera-
tors on visa requirements (to cut down on rejections due to 
clerical errors) are practical steps that could be taken while 
FTA talks are under way. Since the Korean visa rejection rate 
is just above the maximum permitted for the waiver program, 
this could remove a key obstacle to Korea’s inclusion in the 
program.
Kaesong Industrial Complex
The Kaesong industrial complex is the centerpiece of North-
South economic cooperation under the peace and prosperity 
policy of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.24 At present 
roughly a dozen South Korean firms operate in the industrial 
park, employing approximately 6,000 North Koreans produc-
ing labor-intensive manufactures. (To date North and South 
Korea have not opened the zone to third-country firms.) Seoul 
envisions firms in the industrial park ultimately employing 
more than 700,000 North Korean workers producing heavy 
chemical and engineering products. At the start, however, the 
establishment of production in the zone has been complicated 
by restrictions on the transfer of potential military-use tele-
communications and capital equipment under the multilateral 
24.This section draws primarily from a draft by Marcus Noland and his recent 
congressional testimony, North Korea: Illicit Activity Funding the Regime, 
Hearing of the US Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, and International Security, April 25, 2006.
Wassenaar Arrangement (in which both the United States and 
South Korea participate), though these considerations do not 
appear to be a significant constraint on the incumbent firms’ 
operations at this time.
South Korea has requested duty-free treatment for prod-
ucts produced in Kaesong in other FTA negotiations. Prod-
ucts produced in the zone are granted duty-free treatment in 
South Korea’s agreement with Singapore and receive duty-free 
treatment subject to a rule that 60 percent of the content is 
South Korean in South Korea’s agreement with the European 
Free Trade Association.
In the case of the Korea-US FTA, however, the situation is 
a bit more complicated. The United States maintains an exten-
sive set of economic sanctions against North Korea dating back 
to 1950.25 North Korea is among the few countries to which 
the United States does not grant normal trade relations status, 
and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 
2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be highest on the sorts of 
labor-intensive products currently manufactured at Kaesong, 
so duty-free treatment could be critical to successfully export-
ing to the United States from the zone.
Realistically,  the  volume  of  exports  emanating  from 
Kaesong will likely remain trivial for some time. Nonetheless, 
the South Korean side may well insist on its inclusion. From 
the standpoint of rapidly and successfully concluding an FTA 
between the United States and South Korea, however, a request 
for duty-free treatment for Kaesong-produced goods is a high-
cost, low-payoff addition to the negotiating agenda—and one 
that could put the entire initiative in jeopardy.
If  Kaesong  is  included  in  the  negotiation,  it  also  will 
create a thorny issue with respect to labor standards, and the 
AFL-CIO has already indicated that it will press this point. 
The issues are two-fold.
Substantively, North Korea does not meet internationally 
recognized core labor standards; rights to associate, organize, 
and bargain collectively are absent entirely in autocratic North 
Korea, nor does the regime allow international monitoring of 
labor conditions. At Kaesong, workers are not hired directly—
instead they are hired through a North Korean government 
agency, which reputedly retains a large share of the $57.50 
per month paid to the government labor broker on behalf 
of the worker by the South Korean employer to cover social 
security payments as well as transportation and other in-kind 
benefits.26 Moreover, according to South Korean government 
25.  The United States has never entered into an FTA with a country that is 
the target of US economic sanctions.
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sources, while South Korean firms pay in hard currency, North 
Korea pays the workers in North Korean won converted at 
the wildly overvalued official exchange rate. Evaluated at the 
more realistic black-market rate, and even with overtime pay, 
North Korean workers net less than $3 per month. That said, 
while conditions in Kaesong may be exploitative, they may 
well be considerably better than those existing elsewhere in 
North Korea.
Procedurally, while the FTA will presumably include a 
labor standards chapter, South Korea has no way to enforce 
such commitments in Kaesong, where North Korea is sover-
eign. One possible solution, already denounced by the South 
Korean Ministry of Unification, would be to involve a third 
party  such  as  the  International  Labor  Organization  (ILO) 
to  monitor  conditions  in  the  zone  and  certify  compliance 
with agreed standards. Such an approach was applied in the 
Cambodian textiles case and has been floated by Jay Lefkow-
itz, President Bush’s special assistant for North Korean human 
rights. But this solution would require the cooperation of the 
North Korean government, which is not a member of the 
ILO, has a track record of noncooperation in other spheres of 
international engagement and to date has restricted access to 
the zone of third-party observers. Indeed, if South Korea were 
to request inclusion of the Kaesong zone in the negotiations, 
the United States conceivably could demand national treat-
ment for US investments within the zone, a request to which 
the North Korean government would never accede even if the 
South Korean government would.
Moreover, these labor concerns add to the considerable 
list  of  US  problems  with  North  Korea,  including  North 
Korean  state  involvement  in  counterfeiting  US  currency, 
nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illegal, illicit, 
or objectionable behavior that already pose serious political 
reports that, with overtime, the actual workweek averages 55 hours, and work-
ers on average receive $67 in gross pay before deductions. See Marcus Noland’s 
testimony, North Korea: Illicit Activity Funding the Regime, Hearing of the 
US Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government 
Information, and International Security, April 25, 2006. 
impediments to an extraterritorial extension of the FTA to 
products from Kaesong. If the labor issues are not adequately 
addressed in the negotiations, the Kaesong issue could well 
damage  prospects  for  concluding  the  FTA  and  doom  the 
ratification process in the US Congress. Labor problems in 
Central  America,  which  almost  scuttled  CAFTA-DR,  pale 
compared with the abuses of the North Korean regime. If 
these practices are ignored in an FTA, congressional scrutiny 
will create a firestorm of opposition to the trade pact with 
Korea—and justifiably so.
implicationS For third coUntrieS 
and the world tradinG SyStem
“Competitive liberalization” is thriving in East Asia; the wave 
of new Korean FTA initiatives reflects this broader regional 
trend. China has taken the lead; its trade talks with ASEAN 
and India have prompted Japan and Korea to emulate the 
Chinese  initiatives.  These  efforts  are  creating  bare-bones 
FTAs, replete with exceptions and with coverage limited to 
border trade barriers for goods. Within a decade, however, one 
should not rule out a nascent East Asian trading arrangement 
involving the “10+4” nations—ASEAN-10 plus China, India, 
Japan, and Korea. To some extent, the US-Korea trade talks 
(as well as US initiatives with ASEAN members) are a preemp-
tive US response to the new regional initiatives among East 
Asian countries.
Those pacts create both opportunities and challenges for 
US and Korean trade policy. To the extent that the regional 
initiatives promote economic growth, they can provide benefits 
that reach beyond the borders of the partner countries. To the 
extent that they involve discrimination against nonmember 
countries (even if the pacts are consistent with WTO obli-
gations), they may adversely affect the trade and investment 
interests in other countries outside the region.
Progress  on  the  US-Korea  pact  could  also  provoke  a 
revival in the stalled talks between Japan and Korea. Japan sells 
Korea, and Korea sells Japan, many of the same products that 
US firms export to both countries, so Japanese firms would 
face  trade  and  investment  diversion  from  two  of  its  most 
important markets (Schott and Goodrich 2004). At the same 
time, the Japanese government could overcome long-standing 
inhibitions and pursue FTA talks with the United States. As 
with Korea, the idea of an FTA has been vetted for a long 
time but shelved due to domestic resistance to agricultural and 
regulatory reforms. Like Korea, Japan has a broad economic 
and foreign policy agenda that could be served by a closer 
partnership with the United States, especially at a time when 
the global trade talks face an uncertain outcome (see below) 
A request for duty-free treatment 
for Kaesong-produced goods is 
a high-cost, low-payoff addition 
to the negotiating agenda—and 
one that could put the entire 
initiative in jeopardy.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4     J u Ne  2 0 0 6
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and when competition from China is moving up the value-
added chain.
Progress on the US-Korea front will also spur new EU 
initiatives in the region. European exports to East Asia have 
revived in the past two years but risk being sideswiped by the 
new preferences accorded by bilateral and regional trade deals 
to which Europe is not a party. As in other regions, EU offi-
cials have emulated US initiatives in Southeast Asia with their 
own version of the US Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative and 
visited Seoul in May 2006 to prepare for EU-Korea bilateral 
trade talks.
The big question mark is whether the competitive liberal-
ization spirit will spawn a trilateral deal between China, Korea, 
and Japan. Such a pact is currently under study in a trilateral 
working group. Whether this effort will pave the road to FTA 
negotiations remains to be seen. We are skeptical, since such 
studies often are commissioned simply to defer decisions on 
politically sensitive matters. But a Northeast Asian FTA would 
link three powerful manufacturing economies with substantial 
financial resources and all but ensure the eventual expansion 
to the “10 + 3” East Asian free trade zone, since each North-
east Asian country is conducting parallel negotiations with 
ASEAN members.
Will this lead to the fulfillment of the original APEC 
vision of free trade and investment in the region by 2020, 
agreed at Bogor, Indonesia in 1994? The APEC Business Advi-
sory Council advocated a renewed look at a Free Trade Area 
of the Asia-Pacific in their report to APEC leaders in Santiago 
in November 2004. Not surprisingly, the official reaction was 
muted. No US (or Japanese) politician wants to talk about 
free trade with China—even as a long-term proposition. But 
events  may  propel  reconsideration  in  the  coming  years  as 
FTAs and WTO liberalization work in tandem to push trade 
liberalization across the Asia-Pacific region.
What impact will the FTA talks have on the WTO and 
the current Doha Round? US FTAs with Korea (and Malay-
sia and possibly others) are being advanced as complements 
to efforts to complete the Doha Round and as part of the 
response to the spurt of FTA activity in East Asia by China 
and other countries. At the same time, these pacts provide a 
fallback strategy in the event the WTO talks falter or produce 
insufficient liberalization.
If the WTO negotiators overcome obstacles that to date 
have forestalled progress, then the FTA initiatives could have 
a largely positive impact on the Doha Round. The reasoning is 
straightforward. Any prospective deal in the Doha Round will 
be possible only if the major trading nations, including Korea 
and Japan, agree to significantly reduce their farm trade barri-
ers—not free trade but reforms that actually make a difference 
and open new trading opportunities. The FTA should make it 
easier for Korea to undertake multilateral (albeit incremental) 
obligations in the Doha Round because the FTA will spur 
long-run adjustments in agricultural production and incomes 
policy. Indeed, Korea (and potentially Japan) could well be 
“paid twice”—in terms of the mercantilist logic of trade nego-
tiations—for their farm-sector reforms through both FTA and 
WTO “concessions” from key trading partners.
If the Doha Round falters, the pursuit of bilateral FTAs 
and regional trading arrangements will undoubtedly accelerate 
in East Asia. US officials will redirect attention from Geneva 
to FTAs in East Asia, expand already growing trade arrange-
ments in South Asia and possibly launch new trade talks with 
Japan. European proposals similar to those being advanced by 
the United States will likely be launched with East and South 
Asian countries.
conclUSion
If the United States wants an FTA with Korea, it will have 
to put long-standing US barriers to Korean exports on the 
negotiating table and resolve vexing problems regarding access 
to the US visa waiver program. But to get the US Congress 
to accept such reforms, US negotiators will have to receive 
commitments to significant Korean reforms in areas of US 
export interest, including agriculture. Note that an FTA does 
not require free trade in agriculture, but a deal must include 
substantial new trade opportunities for US farmers to pass the 
political test in Washington and the legal test in the WTO.
Such a deal, of course, will pose a stiff political challenge 
for Korean officials. However, Korea will be under pressure 
in any event to reform its farm policies—either in the context 
of a final deal in the Doha Round or in response to Chinese 
initiatives in the region, which include agriculture and which 
Korea will need to match. Absent the Doha Round rationale, 
securing political support for Korean farm reforms will be 
more tenuous. However, changing demographics suggest that 
Korea could deflect at least some of the domestic opposition 
to farm reforms by switching from trade protection to income 
support for Korean farmers. In fact, the Korean government 
did commit more than $1 billion for agricultural adjustment 
programs subsequent to the passage of the Korea-Chile FTA; 
since then, it has budgeted more than $120 billion over ten 
years  to  facilitate  the  further  restructuring  of  Korea’s  agri-
cultural  economy.  In  the  context  of  the  Korea-US  FTA,  a 
combination of “decoupled” support for Korean farmers and 
substantial, albeit incomplete, reform of import barriers could N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4   Ju Ne  2 0 0 6
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provide a big boost to Korea’s economy. Such reforms could 
be phased in over time to mitigate the economic adjustment 
pressures and to help manage the political fallout.
Perhaps an even greater challenge will be balancing the 
political and economic objectives of each side. As noted earli-
er, besides “traditional” interests in deepening bilateral trade 
and investment, both countries see the FTA as a vehicle to 
advance important foreign policy objectives, particularly the 
strengthening of cooperation on security issues in Northeast 
Asia. Getting the two sides on a common page regarding poli-
cies toward North Korea will be contentious and require skill-
ful management. From a US perspective, it is hard to see how 
the FTA could grant advantages to North Korean production 
while that country obstructs the six-party talks on security 
issues and engages in abusive labor practices and counterfeit-
ing of US currency; ignoring these problems risks jeopardiz-
ing the entire initiative. From a Korean perspective, a policy 
of constructive engagement with North Korea is understand-
able, even though at present the economic implications of the 
specific Kaesong initiative are minor. 
Given North Korean intransigence, we suspect that the 
prudent course would be to exclude North Korean–produced 
goods and services from the FTA until compliance with the 
pact’s rights and obligations can be adequately monitored and 
enforced. But it also makes sense to support the South Korean 
vision for Korean unification by setting out procedures in the 
FTA itself for updating the pact if and when the reunification 
process advances.
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Table 1   Bilateral FTA partners of the United States as of June 2006 (billions of dollars)
US merchandise trade, 2005
Country/region 2005 GDP US exports toa US imports fromb Trade balance Total trade FTA statusc
Canada 1,10. 1. . –10. 0. A
Mexico . 101. 1. –. 0. A
Korea .1 . . –1. . C
Malaysia 10. . . –. . C
Singapore 11. 1. 1.1 . . A
Thailand 1. . 1. –1. . C
CAFTA-d . 11. 1. –1. . A/B
Israel 1. . 1. –10. . A
Australia 0.0 1. . . .0 A
Indonesia .0 .0 11. –. 1. D
Colombia 1. .0 . –. 1. C
Chile 11.0 . . –.1 11. A
SACU-e, f . . . –. 10. C
United Arab Emirates 1. . 1. . . C
Dominican Republic . . . –0. .0 B
Ecuadorf .1 1. . –.1 . C
Peru . .0 .1 –.1 . B
Egypt .0 .1 .1 1.1 . D
Panama 1. .0 0. 1. . C
Jordan 1. 0. 1. –0. 1. A
Oman 0. 0. 0. 0.1 1.0 B
Morocco .0 0. 0. 0.0 1.0 A
Bahrain 1. 0. 0. –0.1 0. B
Subtotal 
(FTA partners) ,. 1.1 . –. 1,00.
United States  
(world trade totals) 1,. 0.0 1,. –. ,.
a. US domestic exports.
b. US imports for consumption. 
c. A = in effect; B = signed; C = under negotiation; D = under consideration
d. CAFTA-: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
e. SACU-: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.  
f. Suspended in April 00.
Sources: GDP: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database, September 00; trade data: USITC Dataweb.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4     J u Ne  2 0 0 6
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Table 2   Bilateral FTA partners of Korea as of June 2006 (billions of dollars)
Korean merchandise trade, 2005
Country/region 2005 GDP Korean exports to Korean imports from Trade balance Total trade FTA statusa
Japan ,1. .0 . –. . C 
United States 1,. 1. 0. 10. . C
ASEAN-10b 1. . .1 1. . B
Singapore 11. . . .1 1. A 
India . . .1 . . D 
Canada 1,10. . . 0. .0 C 
Mexico . . 0. . . Dc
Chile 11.0 1. . –1.1 . A 
EFTA-d . 1.1 1. –0. . A (July 00)
New Zealand 10. 0. 0. –0. 1. De
Subtotalf 
(FTA partners)
1,1. 11.1 10. –. .
Korea  
(world trade totals)
.1 . 1. . .
a. A = in effect; B = signed; C = under negotiation; D = under consideration
b. ASEAN-10: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. All signed except Thailand.
c. Korea and Mexico have begun talks on a strategic economic complementary agreement, which is similar to a trade and investment framework 
agreement–plus and is seen as a precursor to an FTA.
d. EFTA-: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Due to data unavailability, figures for EFTA- do not include the contribution from 
Liechtenstein.
e. No date has been set for the start of formal Korea–New Zealand negotiations.
f. Due to its inclusion in ASEAN-10, Singapore is counted twice in these subtotals.
Sources: GDP: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database, September 00; trade data: UN Comtrade database.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4   Ju Ne  2 0 0 6
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Table 3  Korea: Major trading partners (billions of dollars, percent share of world total in parentheses)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Korean exports to
United States . 1. . . . 1.
(1.) (0.) (0.) (1.) (1.) (1.)
 Japan 0. 1. 1.1 1. 1. .0
(11.) (11.0) (.) (.) (.) (.)
China, excluding Hong Kong 1. 1. . .1 . 1.
(10.) (1.1) (1.) (1.1) (1.) (1.)
European Union . 1. 1. . . .
(1.) (1.0) (1.) (1.) (1.) (1.)
Subtotal 100.0 85.5 93.4 111.5 152.2 170.9
(58.0) (56.8) (57.5) (57.5) (60.0) (60.1)
World total 172.3 150.4 162.5 193.8 253.8 284.4
Korean imports from
United States . . .0 . . 0.
(1.) (1.) (1.1) (1.) (1.) (11.)
Japan 1. . . . .1 .
(1.) (1.) (1.) (0.) (0.) (1.)
China, excluding Hong Kong 1. 1. 1. 1. . .
(.0) (.) (11.) (1.) (1.) (1.)
European Union 1. 1. 1.1 1. . .
(.) (10.) (11.) (10.) (10.) (10.)
Subtotal 89.6 77.2 87.4 102.4 128.7 145.0
(55.8) (54.7) (57.5) (57.3) (57.3) (55.5)
World total 160.5 141.1 152.1 178.8 224.5 261.2
Note: Exports are free on board (fob) basis and imports are cost, insurance, freight (cif) basis.

























0 Table 4  US-Korea merchandise trade, 2001–05






















US exportsb to Korea
Total merchandisec 0, 100 1,11 100 , 100 , 100 ,10 100
Total agricultured, of which: , 11 , 1 , 1 ,0  ,01 
Cereals (Ch. 10)    1  1    
Fish (Ch. ) 10 1 0 1 1   1  1
Oilseeds & fruits (Ch. 1)  1       0 1
Beef (Ch. )     1   0 11 1
Total manufacturese, of which: 1,  1,0  1,0  ,1 1 ,10 
Electronics (Ch. ) ,  ,00  ,  ,0  , 
Nuclear reactors and machinery (Ch. ) , 1 , 1 ,1 1 , 1 , 1
Precision equipment (Ch. 0) 1,11  1,0  1,0  1,1  ,0 
Organic chemicals (Ch. )   1,0  1,  ,  1, 
Aircraft (Ch. ) ,1 1 ,0 11 1,0  1,  1, 
Plastics (Ch. )       0   
Automobiles (Ch. )     0     
US importsf from Korea
Total merchandise ,1 100 , 100 , 100 ,0 100 ,1 100
Total agriculture  1  1 0 1 0 1  1
Total manufactures, of which: ,  ,0  ,  ,  ,0 
Electronics (Ch. ) 11,1  11,  1,1  1,  1, 1
Automobiles (Ch. ) ,1 0 , 1 ,  10,  10, 
Nuclear reactors and machinery (Ch. ) , 1 , 1 , 1 ,1 1 ,1 1
Mineral fuels and oils (Ch. )  1  1 1 1  1 1,10 
Articles of iron or steel (Ch. )         1,0 
HS = Harmonized System
a. Share of total merchandise export, import trade.
b. Domestic exports.
c. HS Ch. 1–.
d. HS Ch. 1–.
e. HS Ch. –.
f. Imports for consumption.

























Table 5  US-Korea electronics trade, 2001–05






















US electronics exportsb to Korea
Total electronics (Ch. ), of which: , 100 ,00 100 , 100 ,0 100 , 100
Digital circuits (1) 0 0 ,0  ,  ,  , 1
Other circuits () 0 0 0 10 0   1  
US electronics importsc from Korea
Total electronics (Ch. ), of which: 11,1 100 11, 100 1,1 100 1, 100 1, 100
Cellular phones (000) ,0  ,1  ,00  ,  , 
Digital circuits (1) 0 0 ,  , 1 ,1 1 ,1 1
a. Share of total electronics export, import trade (Ch. ). 
b. Domestic exports.



























Table 6  US-Korea automobile trade, 2001–05






















US automobile exportsb to Korea
Total automobiles (Ch. ), of which:  100  100 0 100  100  100
Parts (0) 11    10    0 
Airbags, door assemblies, body stampings (0)   0   10  1 10 1
Gear boxes (00)  1  1   1   1
Cars of cylinder capacity between 100 to 000cc (0) 0   11      
Tanks (1000)  1  1  1  1  
Cars of cylinder capacity in excess of 000cc (0)       1   
US automobile importsc from Korea
Total automobiles (Ch. ), of which: ,1 100 , 100 , 100 10, 100 10, 100
Cars of cylinder capacity between 100 and 000cc (0) ,01  ,1  ,1  ,0  ,1 
Cars of cylinder capacity in excess of 000cc (0)   1, 1 1,1 0 ,  , 
Parts (0) 1  1  0     
Cars of cylinder capacity between 1000 and 100cc (0) 1 1  10      1
a. Share of total automobile export, import trade (Ch. ).
b. Domestic exports.
c. Imports for consumption.
Source: USITC Dataweb.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4   Ju Ne  2 0 0 6
















US exports to Korea
Total private services ,0 100 ,0 100 ,11 100
Transportation ,1  ,  , 
Travel ,1  ,11  ,1 
Passenger fares 1 0  1  1
Other transportation ,0  ,1  ,1 
Royalties and license fees 1,1 1 1,1 1 1, 1
Other private services ,0  ,1 1 , 0
Education 0 11  1 1,01 1
Financial services 0     
Insurance  1  1  1
Telecommunications 11 1 11 1 11 1
Business, professional, and technical services  10  10  
Miscellaneous services   00   
US imports from Korea
Total private services , 100 , 100 , 100
Transportation ,  ,0  , 0
Travel  0 0 1 0 1
Passenger fares 1,110  1,01  1,10 
Other transportation 1,  ,1  , 
Royalties and license fees 1   1 0 1
Other private services 1 11 11   
Education  0  0 1 0
Financial services      
Insurance  0  0 11 0
Telecommunications 1 1   1 1
Business, professional, and technical services 1  10  11 
Miscellaneous services 10  1  1 
a. Share of total private services export, import trade.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business (October 00).N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4     J u Ne  2 0 0 6

Table 8  Korea: Inward FDI flows by country, 2001–04


















Americas, of which:  ,      ,0      1,      ,1   1 
United States  ,      ,01      1,0   1   ,1    
Asia, of which:  ,   1   ,      1,      ,    
Japan        1,0   1   1      ,   1 
China  0   1         0   1   1,1    
European Union, of which:  ,0      1,0   1   ,0      ,00    
Netherlands  1,   11   1      11      1,0   10 
Rest of world  01               1       
Total  11,   100   ,10   100   ,   100   1,   100 
FDI = foreign direct investment
Source: Korea Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, http://english.mocie.go.kr/.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4   Ju Ne  2 0 0 6

Table 9   US-Korea semiconductor disputes
Year                                                       Event
WTO: Round 1
1  US Department of Commerce decides not to revoke an antidumping duty on Korean dynamic random 
access memory chips (DRAMS).
Korea requests consultations at the WTO.
1                            WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) sides with Korea, finding the United States in violation 
                                      of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
000  Korea petitions WTO to reassemble the 1 DSB, claiming that in its attempt to comply with the 
board’s ruling, the United States again violated the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The United States and Korea notify the WTO of a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter, which 
includes the United States revoking its antidumping duty on Korean DRAMS.
WTO: Round 2
00  US Department of Commerce levies  percent countervailing duty on Korean DRAMS, citing a Korean 
government subsidy to Hynix Semiconductor, the recipient of credit from banks allegedly pressured 
into such lending by the Korean government.
    Korea requests consultations at the WTO.
 
00  WTO DSB sides with the United States on the issue of injury on all but one claim.
WTO DSB sides with Korea on the issue of subsidy, noting that the Department of Commerce produced 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate a government subsidy to Hynix.
                   The United States appeals the DSB decision regarding the Department of Commerce’s determination of 
subsidy.
Appellate DSB reverses earlier decision regarding Department of Commerce’s subsidy determination 
and sides with the United States, allowing the countervailing duty against Hynix to  remain in effect. 
Sources:  WTO, www.wto.org; US State Department, usinfo.state.gov.N u m b e r   P b 0 6 - 4     J u N e   2 0 0 6

Table 10  Overall welfare results (change in equivalent variation)
Medium run: 
Capital stock ﬁ  xed
Long run: 
Capital grows
Country Rice excluded Pure FTA Rice excluded Pure FTA
Korea Billions of dollars 0.0 . 0. 1.
Percent of GDP . .1 .1 .0
United States Billions of dollars . 0. 1. .
Percent of GDP 0.0 0.01 0.10 0.0
Japan Billions of dollars 0. 1. 0.0 1.
Percent of GDP 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0
Rest of the world Billions of dollars –.1 –.1 –.0 –.
Percent of GDP –0.0 –0.0 –0.0 –0.0
Table 11    Change in real factor prices (percent)
Medium run: 
Capital stock ﬁ  xed
Long run: 
Capital grows
Factor of production Rice excluded Pure FTA  Rice excluded Pure FTA
Korea
Unskilled labor 11. 11. 1. 1.
Skilled labor 1. 1.1 1.0 1.
Capital 11. 1. .0 .
Land  –11. –. –.1 –0.
Natural resources –.0 –. –. –.1
United States
Unskilled labor 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Skilled labor –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0
Capital 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1
Land  . 1. . 1.

























Table 12 Change in output (percent)
Medium term Long term
Share of output Rice excluded Pure FTA Rice excluded Pure FTA
Category Korea




 United   
States Korea




Paddy rice 0.00 0.0001 –0. –.1 –. 1. 1. –.0 –. .
Wheat 0.001 0.000 1. –.1 .1 –1.0 . –. . –1.1
Vegetables and fruits 0.001 0.001 10. –0. . –. 1. –0. . –.
Other primary products 0.01 0.01 –. . –.1 . –.0 . –. .
Beef 0.000 0.00 110. –0. 110.1 –0. 10. –0. 11. –0.
Other meat 0.00 0.00 . –0. . –1.0 10. –0. 10. –1.0
Dairy 0.00 0.00 . –0.1 . –0. . 0.0 . –0.1
Processed rice 0.00 0.0001 . 0.0 .1 –1.1 1.0 0.1 .0 –0.
Other food products 0.0 0.00 1. 0. . 0.1 .0 0. . 0.
Textiles 0.0 0.001 1. –1. 1. –1. 1. –1. 1. –1.
Wearing apparel 0.00 0.001 . –0. . –1.0 0.1 –0. 1. –0.
Leather products 0.00 0.000 .1 –1. . –1. 1. –1. . –1.
Chemical, rubber, and plastic products 0.0 0.0 –0. –0. 0. –0. . -0. .1 –0.
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals 0.0 0.011 . –0. . –1.0 1. –0. 1. –1.1
Motor vehicles 0.0 0.00 –. –0. –. –0. –0. –0. 0.0 –0.
Other transport 0.01 0.010 –1. –0. –1.1 –0. –1. –0. –11. –0.
Electronic equipment 0.01 0.01 –1. –0. –1. –0. –10. –0. –. –0.
Other machinery and equipment 0.0 0.0 –1. –0. –1. –0. –. –0. –. –0.
Other manufactured goods 0.000 0.0 . –0. . –0. . –0. 1. –0.
Trade and transport services 0.11 0.11 0. 0.0 1. 0.0 . 0.0 .0 0.0
Business services 0.1 0.1 –. 0.0 –. 0.0 . 0.0 .1 0.0
Other services 0. 0.1 0. 0.0 0. 0.0 . 0.1 . 0.1N u m b e r   P b 0 6 - 4     J u N e   2 0 0 6

Table 13   Initial tariﬀ   rates in the model (ad valorem percent)
                  United
Category                  Korea                   States
Paddy rice 1,000.0 .
Wheat . 0.0
Vegetables and fruits . 0.
Other primary products 1. 0.
Beef .0 0.
Other meat . .
Dairy . 1.
Processed rice 1,000.0 .
Other food products 1. .
Textiles . 11.0
Wearing apparel 1. 1.1
Leather products . 11.1
Chemical, rubber, and plastic products . .0
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals .0 1.
Motor vehicles . .
Other transport 0. 0.1
Electronic equipment 0. 0.
Other machinery and equipment . 1.
Other manufactured goods . .
Trade and transport services 0.0 0.0
Business services 0.0 0.0
Other services 0.0 0.0N u m b e r   P b 0 6 - 4   J u N e   2 0 0 6

Table 13   Initial tariﬀ   rates in the model (ad valorem percent)
                  United
Category                  Korea                   States
Paddy rice 1,000.0 .
Wheat . 0.0
Vegetables and fruits . 0.
Other primary products 1. 0.
Beef .0 0.
Other meat . .
Dairy . 1.
Processed rice 1,000.0 .
Other food products 1. .
Textiles . 11.0
Wearing apparel 1. 1.1
Leather products . 11.1
Chemical, rubber, and plastic products . .0
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals .0 1.
Motor vehicles . .
Other transport 0. 0.1
Electronic equipment 0. 0.
Other machinery and equipment . 1.
Other manufactured goods . .
Trade and transport services 0.0 0.0
Business services 0.0 0.0
Other services 0.0 0.0




 excluded Category Pure FTA
Paddy rice 1,0 –, –1,1
Wheat 1,000 1,1 1,
Vegetables and fruits 1,0 –,1 –0,01
Other primary products 1,0 –1, –11,0
Beef ,00 ,00 ,1
Other meat 1,0 1, 1,
Dairy ,00 ,0 ,1
Processed rice ,10 1 ,
Other food products 11,0 ,0 ,0
Textiles ,10 ,1 ,
Wearing apparel 10,0 ,1 0,
Leather products ,0 , ,
Chemical, rubber, and plastic products 0,0 –, ,
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals 1,0 1, ,
Motor vehicles ,00 –11,01 –,
Other transport 1,0 –, –0,10
Electronic equipment 1,00 –1, –,1
Other machinery and equipment ,0 –1,1 –0,
Other manufactured goods ,000 1, ,
Trade and transport services ,0,00 10,10 0,01
Business services ,1,10 –, –,
Other services ,,0 ,0 ,1
total net change , –1,N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4     J u Ne  2 0 0 6
0
Table 15  US-Korea memoranda of understanding (MoU) on automobiles
Topic 1995 MoU 1998 MoU
General provisions Market access increase sought for 
foreign passenger vehicles in Korea.
Market access increase sought for foreign passenger 
vehicles in Korea.
Korea barred from taking any new 
measures that adversely affect market 
access for foreign passenger vehicles.
Korea barred from taking any new measures that 
adversely affect market access for foreign passenger 
vehicles.
Tariff and taxes Special consumption tax reduced from  
to 0 percent for autos over 000cc.
Bound tariff rate on autos reduced from 0 
to  percent.
Annual vehicle tax reduced from 10 
to 10 won/cc for autos between 
00cc and 000cc and from 0 to 0 
won/cc for autos larger  than 000cc.
Annual vehicle tax reduced to 0 won/cc 
for autos larger than 000cc.
Subway bond rate equalized for foreign 
and domestic autos.
Education tax eliminated.
Rural development tax eliminated.
Special consumption tax will continue decreasing 
through July 00.
Standards and certification Safety compliance test threshold raised 
from 100 to 00 units annually per model.
Safety compliance test threshold raised from 1,000 
units annually to ,00 units by January 001.
Corecognition granted for  US standards 
inspections.
Corecognition granted for 1 US/EC standards 
inspections.
Basic vehicle type approval process 
streamlined.
Basic vehicle type approval process streamlined.
US/EC headlamp standard adopted. US/EC headlamp standard adopted.
ISO pass-by noise standard adopted. ISO pass-by noise standard adopted.
Self-completion test permitted by approved 
foreign manufacturers.
Self-completion test permitted by approved foreign 
manufacturers.
Six standards tests eliminated: 
acceleration test, climbing steep hill test, 
maximum speed test, minimum turning 
radius test, maximium stable inclination 
angle test, and 0,000 km durability test.
Durability test eliminated.
One of two exhaust pipe inclination requirements 
eliminated.
US Environmental Protection Agency permitted to 
conduct streamlined environmental inspections, 
supervised by Korean Ministry of Environment.
Self-certification system adopted for foreign 
automakers to verify safety requirements.
“Global agreement” on international recognition of 
standards, signed by the United States, European 
Union and Japan, is adopted.
                                                                 
Financing Foreign entities permitted to establish 
or acquire passenger vehicle financing 
operations.
Secure finance system created for the purchase of 
foreign motor vehicles (with effective foreclosure 
procedures and a government database of vehicle 
registration).
                                          (table continues next page)N u m b e r   P b 0 6 - 4   J u N e   2 0 0 6
1
Table 15 (continued)
Topic 1995 MoU 1998 MoU
Perceptions of imports The Korea Automobile Importers and 
Distributors Association informed that the 
government policy is not to discourage 
purchase of foreign vehicles.
Discriminatory practices against buyers of foreign 
autos, such as tax audits, are eliminated.
Public outreach, discussion, education, and other 
activities to improve public perceptions of imports 
are planned.
Advertising Television access restrictions on foreign 
manufacturers eliminated.
Note: This is not an exhaustive list of provisions.
table 16   automobile taxes in Korea
Engine displacement 2000cc and below Engine displacement over 2000cc
Line Item Action Cost Action Cost
1 ciF value 100.00 100.00
    Tariff    percent of 1 .00  percent of 1 .00
    Special consumption tax  percent of 1+  .0 10 percent of 1+  10.0
    Education tax 0 percent of  1. 0 percent of  .
5 index price a 1+ 2 + 3 + 4 115.02 1+ 2 + 3 + 4 122.04
    Value added tax 10 percent  of  11.0 10 percent of  1.0
7 retail price 5 + 6 126.52 5 + 6 134.24
    Acquisition tax  percent of  .0  percent of  .
    Registration tax  percent of  .  percent of  .10
10    Subway bond 1 percent of  1.0 0 percent of  .1
11 total cost of car on road 148.38 167.19
a.  Because it varies with each importer, profi  t margin has not been included in index price. Were the margin known and included,  the disparity 
in total cost would be magnifi  ed.
Source:   Korea Automobile Importers and Distributors Association (KAIDA), www.kaida.co.kr/eng/infor/info_tax.jsp (accessed March , 00).N u m b e r   P b 0 6 - 4     J u N e   2 0 0 6

Table 17  US-Korea beef and BSE issues
Year/period                                   Event
Beef
1  USTR initiates section 01 investigation into Korea’s rules for beef imports.a
1  GATT trade dispute panel concludes that Korea’s quantitative restrictions on beef imports, 
which had been imposed under the balance of payments exception, are inconsistent with GATT 
obligations.b
10  US-Korea bilateral beef agreementb (to implement recommendations 
                                      of GATT panel)
  •  Quotas gradually increase.
                                     •  Simultaneous buy/sell framework designed.
1  US-Korea bilateral beef agreementc
                                     •  Quotas gradually increase.
                                                            •  Simultaneous buy/sell framework refi  ned.
1   The United States initiates section 01 investigation into Korea’s rules for beef imports.d
1   The United States requests consultations at the WTO with Korea for beef shelf-life restrictions.e
  US-Korea bilateral beef agreementd
  •  Shelf-life restrictions phased out.
                                                           •  Beef manufacturers allowed to set their own “use by” dates.
1  Korea signifi  cantly increases producer support to beef industry.f
1  The United States and Australia request consultations with Korea at the WTO for beef issues.f
000  WTO appellate panel condemns Korea for beef policy (wholesale distribution rules, 
                                                         excessive domestic support, discrimination against grass-fed cattle imports, etc.)e
001  Korea imposes tariffi   cation for beef imports (roughly 0 percent  duty).g
BSE Saga
January 1–                                   Korea imports $1 million of US beef and beef products, making it the third largest market for
December , 00                  US beef exports.h
December , 00                  Korea bans imports of US beef, citing one positive case of BSE detected in the state of         
Washington, the fi  rst ever in the United States.i
January 00                              Korea agrees to reopen its market to imports of US beef from cattle less than 0 months 
                                                        of age.
                                                      
This accord does not aff  ect the majority of traditional US beef exports to Korea, such as beef     
with bones, which constituted more than half of US exports to Korea prior to the 00 ban.j
March 00                    The United States confi  rms BSE in one cow from Alabama.k
Sources:
a.  New York Times, June 1,1.
b.  USTR, 1993 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 1.   
c.   USTR, 1997 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, .
d.  USITC, The Year in Trade 1995, –.
e.   World Trade Organization, www.wto.org.
f.    USITC, The Year in Trade 1999, –.
g.   WTO (00, –).
h.   USDA news release, “Johanns and USTR Portman Welcome Progress to Reopen Korean Market to US Beef,” January 1, 00.
i.    Washington Post, December , 00, A1.
j.    Inside US Trade, January 0, 00, 11.
k.   USDA news release, “Statement by USDA Chief Veterinary Offi   cer John Cliff  ord (DVM) Regarding Positive BSE Test Results,” 
      March 1, 00.N u m b e r   P b 0 6 - 4   J u N e   2 0 0 6

Th   e views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Th   is publication is part of the
overall program of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily
reﬂ  ect the views of individual members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
Table 18   US antidumping and countervailing duty cases against Korea
                    (as of February 1, 00)
Product Industry Date ordered
US antidumping orders
Top-of-the-stove stainless steel cooking ware Miscellaneous January 1
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) fi  lm Chemicals June 11
Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe Iron/steel November 1
Welded ASTM A-1 stainless steel pipe Iron/steel December 1
Stainless steel butt-weld pipe fi  ttings  Iron/steel February 1
Corrosion-resistant carbon steel ﬂ  at product Iron/steel August 1
Oil country tubular goods Iron/steel August 1
Stainless steel wire rod Iron/steel September 1
Stainless steel plate in coils Iron/steel May 1
Stainless steel sheet & strip  Iron/steel July 1
Carbon steel plate  Iron/steel February 000
Polyester staple fi  ber  Miscellaneous May 000
Structural steel beams Iron/steel August 000
Stainless steel angle  Iron/steel May 001
Steel concrete reinforcing bar  Iron/steel September 001
Stainless steel bar  Iron/steel March 00
Polyvinyl alcohol  Chemicals October 00
Prestressed concrete steel wire strand Iron/steel January 00
US countervailing duties
Top-of-the-stove stainless steel cooking ware  Miscellaneous January 1
Corrosion-resistant carbon steel ﬂ  at product  Iron/steel August 1
Stainless steel sheet and strip  Iron/steel August 1
Carbon steel plate  Iron/steel February 000
Structural steel beams Iron/steel August 000
Dynamic random access memory chips Semiconductors August 00
Summary
   Total US orders in eff  ect 0
   Total US orders against Korea 
   Korean share of total orders (percent) .
   Korean share of US goods imports, 00 (percent) .
Source: US International Trade Commission, www.usitc.gov.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4     J u Ne  2 0 0 6
N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 4   Ju Ne  2 0 0 6
